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"Double Dipping": The Combined Effects of Social Security and
Civil Service Pensions on Employee Retirement
ABSTRACT
We consider the retirement behavior of civilian employees of the
United States government. Unlike previous studies, this investigation
is based upon a data set containing fairly complete and accurate information
aboutthe Social Security and employer—provided pensions for which employees
are (or ultimately will be) eligible. These data permit ustospecify thefinancial aspects of individual retirement decisions with a reasonable
degree of precision. A large fraction of civil service pensioners is
eligible to receive Social Security benefits because a part of their working
careerswas spent in Social—.Security—covered employment. The prevalence
of double pension coverage among governmentemployees has raised serious
equityquestions about the treatmentof civil servants by Social Security,
andthese questions have ledto various suggestions for pension reform.
Partly, the reform proposals have been put forward due to the perceived
unfairnessof "double dipping" which arises from the double pension coverage
of government employees.
Ouranalysis finds: (1) Both the amount of a Federal pension entitle-
ment and the expected wait until the pension commences affect the timing
of retirement from the Federal service. (2) The rate of anticipated wage
growth significantly affects individual decisions to remain in Federal
employment. (3) Workers who are eligible to ultimately receive Social
Security in some cases show a different pattern of retirement than do workers
not vested in Social Security. However, our analysis does not reveal any
massive shift of Federal workers into Social—Security—covered employment
in order to benefit from the "tilt" in the Social Security formula.
Gary Burtless
Jerry A. Hausman





Employer—provided pension plans have substantial impacts on the timing of
employee retirement. In large measure, these impacts are intentional. Pension
programs are frequently designed to provide powerful incentives to discourage
turnover among experienced personnel, but also to encourage job leaving among
older or very senior employees whose productivity may be declining. Among older
workers in particular, the characteristics of employer—provided pension plans may
have important consequences on the decision to remain employed with a particular
employer, find employment elsewhere, or leave market work altogether. While the
effect of Social Security on retirement has frequently been the subject of study,
the effect of employer—provided pension schemes has received far less scrutiny.
Both types of pension programs should be considered in a well specified model of
individual retirement decisions. Unfortunately, the difficulties of obtaining
reliable survey information about the generosity of individual pension entitle—
ments has hindered any careful study of private pension programs and their
impacts on retirement behavior.
In the present paper we consider the retirement behavior of civilian
employees of the United States government, an unusually large employer which
also provides comparatively generous pension benefits. Unlike previous studies,
this investigation is based upon a data set containing fairly complete and accu-
rate information about the Social Security and employer—provided pensions for
which employees are (or ultimately will be) eligible. These data will permit us—2—
to specify the financial aspects of individual retirement decisions with a
reasonable degree of precision. What is more, the data allow us to distinguish
between government "ret irecs" who merely change employers and ones who leave paid
market work completely. The individual's decision to leave government employment
can therefore be treated within the context of a more fundamental consumerchoice
problem, namely, the decision of whether to supply labor to the market.
The government's pension plan deserves attention because of its peculiar
relationship to the American Social Security system. Unlike virtually all other
forms of paid employment in the U.S., Federal government service does not count
in the determination of Social Security Old Age Insurance benefits, nor are wages
from such employment subject to Social Security (FICA) taxes. In spite of this
feature of government employment, a large fraction of civil service pensioners
is eligible to receive Social Security benefits because a part of their working
careers was spent in Social—Security—covered employment. The prevalence of
double pension coverage among government employees has raised serious equity
questions about the treatment of civil servants by Social Security, and these
questions have led to various suggestions for pension reform. An important policy
reform currently under consideration is to bring all Federal government employees
into the Social Security system. Partly, this reform has been put forwafd due to
the perceived unfairness of "double dipping" which arises from the double pension
coverage of government employees. But the short—run impactof reform on the
efficiency of government operations might be substantial if the reform induced
large numbers of exrerienced workers to leave Fed€ral employment. For that
reason, it is of considerable interest to be able toestimate the retirement
effects of a variety of possible reforms. The qualitative choice model we
estimate in this paper permits us to do so.—3—
Of course, the present peculiar relationship between Social Security and
Federal pensions may also induce some civil servants to retire earlier than they
they otherwise might .SinceFederal workers are not covered by Social Security
and hence have typically made only modest contributions to the Social Security
system, individuals may reap important benefits from leaving Federal employment
to work for an employer who is covered by Social Security. Because of a
redistributive "tilt" in the Old Age Insurance benefit formula that favors wage
earners who have made only modest contributions to the system, there may be a
substantial payoff in Social Security retirement benefits for Federal employees
who leave Federal employment to work only a few years in the Social—Security—
covered sector. This redistributive tilt has raised serious equity problems
which have led to calls for reform of the Social Security system as applied to
government employees. Note that an important difference exists with respect to
private sector employees who may also have a private pension and will be eligible
for Social Security benefits. Since they have worked in covered jobs throughout
their career, they do not benefit from the redistributive tilt of Social Security
retirement benefits. Only people who have worked in uncovered jobs for the
majority of their working years, e.g. civil servants, benefit from this provision
in the current Social Security retirement payment schedule. -
Theplan of the paper is as follows. InSection 2 we consider financial
details of the Federal retirment and Social Security Old Age Insurance programs
and describe the inducements for government employees to remain in Federal
employment, to seek employment in the Social—Security—covered sector, or to
retire from gainful employment altogether. In the third section we discuss our
data set and specify the econometric model used in estimation. The information
for this study comes from a large administrative data file containing Federal—4—
employment records, Federal pension records, and Social Security earnings and
benefits records for one percent of all Federal employees who were over the age
of 54 and under 62 during 1976. The empirical results are based on the
retirement decisions of these individuals during 1977. Because of data
limitations it is not now possible to embed the retirement decision in a complete
life—cycle model of savings and labor supply, and our results must be interpreted
with this limitation in mind. The statistical model used in estimation is the
conditional probit model for qualitative choice proposed by Hausman and Wise
(1978). Section 4 contains a discussion of empirical results. In the following
section we consider the impact of reforming the existing Federal pension and
Social Security programs. The paper ends with a summary of our conclusions.—5--
2. FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO LEAVE FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT
Federal workers aged 55 and older who have 30 years of Federal service are
currently eligible for Federal pensions upon retirement from Federal service;
workers aged 60 and older are currently eligible with 20 years' service; and
workers older than 62 are currently eligible with only 5 years' service. The
worker's pension entitlement upon retireement is a multiple (less than 0.80 and
greater than 0.075) of his average salary in his three years of highest wages.
This multiple, which we refer to here as the "replacement rate," is determined on
the basis of years of Federal service.1 Most older Federal workers have worked
many years in Federal service, and consequently may anticipate a Federal pension
that nominally replaces a large fraction of current wage earnings, either
immediately or within a few years. For example, among the 3,116 male Federal
employees in our sample, the average replacement——even without additional years
of service——was close to 50 percent in 1977. Among the 1,040 female employees,
the average replacement rate was over 35 percent.2
Although the prospect of a generous Federal pension may encourage retirement
among older workers, several features of the pension computation may induce
workers to remain i.n Federal service. First, CSRS—vested workers with fewer than
30 years of service must wait until age 60 before their pensions commence;
workers with fewer than 20 years service must wait until age 62. Even without
any complications arising from wage and price inflation, this delay before the
commencement of pension payments must necessarily reduce the present discounted
value of any given stream of pension payments. A the delay lengthens, the
valueof any particular replacement rate declines, and the likelihood of
retirement presumably decreases.—6—
Second, an additional year of Federal service increases the replacement rate
by 2 percentage points.3 This form of deferred compensation should encourage
workers to remain in Federal service, even if they are entitled to receive a
pension immediately upon leaving service. Also, the fact that the wage base for
computing the pension rises with an additional year's service (because nominal
Federal wages rise from year to year) should encourage individuals to remain in
Federal service.
Third, the failure to index the wage base used in computing Federal pension
entitlements may encourage vested Federal workers who are not currently entitled
to receive pensions to remain employed in the Government.L For example, an
employee aged 55 with 27 years' service is eligible to receive a pension equal to
50 percent of his average, high three years' nominal salary. However, since he
has not yet attained 30 years' service, he must wait five years before his
pension will commence. As mentioned earlier, the five years' wait reduces the
present value of the pension, even ignoring problems due to inflation. If in
addition price inflation is 10 percent per year between the age of retirement
(55) and the age of annuity commencement (60), prices will have risen by 61
percent over the period while the nominal amount of the pensionwill have
remained constant. The real value of the pension will have fallen by 38 percent.
The worker can protect himself against this loss in real pension benefits by
remaining in Federal service.
Federal pensioners are protected against rises in the cost of living because
pension payments——as soon as they commence——are indexed to the CPI. For certain
Federal workers, this indexing scheme may provide a perverse incentive to take
early retirement. Consider a Federal worker whose high three years of salary are
W, W (1 +z),and W (1 + respectively. (Thus, s' is the rate of growth of—7—
the worker's wage.) Suppose his replacement rate, based on currentyears of
Federal service, is r. Suppose also that he anticipates futurewage growth equal
to past wage growth, namely, i.Ifhe retires immediately, his first—year
Federal annuity, A1, will be:
w+ w (1+) + w (1+ (1) A1 = 3
•r.
Because his pension is indexed, he can anticipate that after oneyear it would
rise by ,therate of change of prices. Hence, his second—year annuity, A2,
would be A1'(l +). Onthe other hand, if he deferred his retirement for one
year, his second—year annuity, A2', would be:
(2) AW(1++W++W(1+w) (r+O.02)
It can be shown that under certain circumstances, defined in (3) below, the
second—year annuity (and all subsequent years' annuities) will actually be higher
for the worker who chooses to retire rather than work inyear 1. Some algebraic
manipulation shows that:
(3) A2 > A2 1FF
• •+ 2.P20+
Thus,if the rate oF price inflation substantially exceeds the expected rate of
wage change in the Government, the potential retiree may be assured of a higher
nominal (and real) pension if he accepts early retirement rather than if he
defers his retirement for one year.—8—
To see whether the condition defined in (3) above is ever likely to be
encountered, consider some typical values of s' and p in recent years. Federal
workers who are not eligible to receive merit pay increases are typically limited
to a "wage comparability" pay increase of 4.5 to 7 percent.5 In comparison, the
rate of U.S. price inflation has ranged from 6 to 13 percent in recent years. If
the expected rate of Federal wage growth is 7 percent and expected price
inflation is 12 percent, Federal workers with current replacement rates equal to
43percentor more would receive higher annuities if they retired immediately
rather than postponed their retirement. (Federal workers with 24 years or more
of service might thus gain from immediate retirement.) If expected wage growth
were 7 percent and expected inflation were only 10 percent, Federal workerswith
71 percent (or higher) replacement rates might gain through early retirement.
(However, it takes 39 years of Federal service to attain this replacement rate.)
Although the arithmetic may seem arcane, there is little doubt thatthis
perverse inducement to take early retirementis widely understood within the
relevant population. Popular newspaper columns aimed at Federal employees spell
out the pertinent details and provide down—to—earth examples showing which
employees are most likely to lose pension benefits from continuedservice in the
U.S. Government. Shortly before one recent cost—of—living pension increase, for
example, the Washington Post alerted older Federal workers of the gainsfrom
immediate retirement, and concluded with this sensible advice:—9—
President Carter has projected a 6.2 percent active pay raise
for this November [1980]. ..That is an increase much less than
the current rate of inflation. Retirees, on the other hand, are
linked to the rate of inflation with twice yearly adjustments.
The pay raise—retirement squeeze is causing many people to check
their options. If you doubt it, check the number of people retiring
from your agency this month. (Washington Post, February
17, 1980, p.B2)
Of course, for a Federal worker who anticipates that his own wages will rise
rapidly, the gains from immediate retirement are much more slight.
•This section on incentive effects of the CSRS may be suiruinarized by noting
the strikingly different incentives of the system for those who are currently
entitled to pensions, on the one hand, and those who are entitled to pensions
after some delay, on the other. Because the wage base used to compute pensions
is not indexed, the latter group has a strong incentive to remain in Federal
service simply in order to partially protect the real value of its ultimate
pensions. But because wages among older workers may rise more slowly than the
CPI, to which pensions are indexed, workers who are currently entitled to
benefits may retire immediately and receive pensions that are approximately
equal——in real terms——to the pensions that would be obtainable after several
extra years of Federal service.
In addition to the CSRS itself, a number of factors may affect the
retirement decisions of older Federal workers. For present purposes, one of the
most important is entitlement to benefits under OASDHI——the Social Security
system. Federal workers who are not vested in the Social Security system may
leave Federal service in order to become vested. The incentives to do so are
substantial. Benefits under Social Security can begin at age 62 or the year of
vesting in Social Security, whichever occurs later. Since Federal workers in our—10—
sampleare at least 55 years old and must accumulate no more than 33 quarters of
Social Security—covered earnings in order to become vested, Social Security
benefits are not a distant prospect; they can be anticipated in the relatively
near future if vesting occurs. Also, because of the existence of a Social
Security minimum payment amount and other redistributive features of the Social
Security benefit formula, Federal workers who become vested in Social Security
can anticipate receiving benefits under the system that are largerelative to
theirFICA tax withholding. Finally, Social Security benefits, unlike Federal
pension payments, are not subject to state or Federal taxation. Consequently,
thenet, after—tax value of a given Social Security benefit may substantially
exceed that of an equal amount of Federal pension.
Among Federal employees who are already vested in Social Security, the
incentive effects of Social Security are somewhat more ambiguous. Since the wage
base used to compute Social Security benefits is indexed, the real value of a
vested wage earner's pension is generally protected against the price inflation
that occurs between the time the earner leaves covered employment and the time
the Social Security benefit begins. Consequently, there is no particular
incentive to remain in covered employment until just before benefit eligibility
commences as there is in Federal service. On the other hand, for someFederal
workers the real value, of the Social Security pension may be substantially raised
by working one or more additional years in Social—Securitycovered employment.
This could provide an important incentive to leave Federal service for other
employment.
One complicating factor in considering the incentives offered by the Social
Security system is the earning test applied in determining OASI benefits for
those who are currently eligible to receive them. Annual wage earnings in excess50 percent benefit reduction rate for
This tax applies against Federal wages
Consequently, Federal workers who are
to concentrate all of their
asprivate——in the period before they
who are not vested
—11—
of a relatively low limit are subject to a
those receiving Social Security benefits.
as well as Social—Security—covered wages.
vested in Social Security have an incentive
contemplated wage earnings——Federal as well
begin receiving Social Security. By contrast, Federal workers
in Social Security do not have this incentive. Under the CSRS, the onlywage
earningsthat affect the Federal pension entitlement are those that accrue from
continuing in a Federal job; wagesfrom a non—Federal job do not affect either
eligibilityfor or the amount of a Federal pension.
Final factors to consider among determinants of early retirement areage and
health. We expect that advancesin ageand declines in health status should
increasethe probability of leaving work, either in the Government or in the
Social—Security—covered sector. In fact, health status and its interactive
effects with pension eligibility are frequently found to be the most important
factors associated with retirement (see, e.g., Quinn (1977). Unfortunately, the
data at our disposal do not permit us to measure an individual's health status
with any precision. Thus, we have adopted a specification of the effects ofage
that is consistent with our notions about the interrelationship between age and
health. In particular, we believe that among younger workers variations in
health are comparatively less important in determining work status than they are
among older workers. This is primarily because variations in health become more
pronounced as an age cohort becomes older. This general notion will be given
more precision as we describe our empirical specification below.
V—12—
3.EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
In the previous section we described in general terms the factors that may
affect an individual's decision to leave Federal employment. Our discussion
concentrated on the effects of the Federal retirement system itself and on the
possible effects of Social Security and age. In the present section we specify
an empirical estimating equation, and in the next section we summarize the
results obtained from applying it.
There are two general reasons for leaving Federal service. The first is the
desire to leave gainful employment altogether and the second is the desire to
accept a job from a non—Federal employer. Because the incentives that lead
Federal workers to take one or the other of these alternatives are so different,
we have adopted a three—state qualitative choice model. The three states are
defined on the basis of individual information covering the 1977 calendar year.
It will be recalled that our sample consists of men or women aged 54 to 61 who
were Federal employees at the end of 1976. (Employees who did not make wage
contributions to the CSRS are excluded from our sample.) We define an individual
as a "Federal employee" if there is an indication on our file that the person was
Federally employed during 1977 and if there is no indication that he or she began
receiving a Federal pension some time during 1977. Remaining individuals are
definedeither as "privately employed" or as "retired;" a "privately employed"
person is one who has Social—Security—covered wages during 1977,while a
"retiree" does not.
We assume that each ofthethree states just defined have particular
attributesthat individuals find either attractive or unattractrive. To the
extent that two of the states possess a similar attribute, both states should be
viewed similarly by individuals in the sample. To fix ideas, consider an—13—
attribute like "Federal pension benefits." Two states—--"private employment" and
"retirement"——allow individuals to collect the Federal pensions to whichthey may
be entitled, and thus both states ought to be considered identical withrespect
to "Federal pension benefits." (By contrast, the remaining state—--"Federal
employment"——is quite different; current Federal employees cannot collect Federal
pensions.) Other attributes may be unique to a single state. For example, the
only state in which an individual can become entitled to increases in future
Federal pension benefits is "Federal employment." The attributes (or variables)
characterizing the three states are defined in Section 4, below.
The econometric specification used to estimate our model of retirement
decisions is the covariance probit model of Hausman and Wise (1978). The
covariance probit specification removes the independence assumption of the
conditional logit specification which has characterized previous econometric work
on retirement, e.g., Boskin and Hurd (1978). The reason that the independence
assumption seems improper in the context of a model of retirement is that two of
our three states, working for the Federal government or working in the private
sector, seem closer together in terms of the unobserved attributes than does the
third state, complete retirement. The covariance probit specificationassumes
that a distribution of tastes exists in the population. Here we assume a
distribution of tastes, exists for work (or leisure), so that an individual witha
lower than average preference for leisure will be more likely to be in either of
the first two states than an observationally equivalent individual with a higher
than average preference for leisure. Only through relaxing the assumption of
independence can we allow these differential taste factors to enter the model and
influence choice of work states or retirement states.-14-
The specification of the model assumes a level of utility Ujj for person
i in state j. Let Xj stand for attributes of state j for person i, e.g.,
the individual's nominal federal pension entitlement, and Si stand for
individual attributes such as age. Then utility Ujj can be decomposed,
without loss of generality, into a deterministic part, which represents the
"average" individual, and a stochastic term, which represents the deviation from
average utility for this particular individual:
(4) U.. =u(x..,s.) ff(X. .,S.) + Cx. .,s.) jl,2,3 il,n
13 13 1 i31 13 1
=11.. +c..
13 13
In equation (4) the tT (.) terms represent how the average individual with
attributes (X.,s.) would value the utility from state j. The (X. .,s) term
13 1 13 1
represents the deviation from average and therefore has expectation equalto
zero.6 The discrete choice model then assumes that person i chooses state j if
his utility in that state is highest. Since the cd's introduce a stochastic
element into the model we have a probability statement for eachoutcome. For
instance, the probability that person i chooses state 1, herecontinued Federal
employment, is
(5)- C.=pr(personimakes choice 1) =pr(U.> U. & U. > U. )
11 11 12 11 13
pr(iY. —1J. >c. —e.&V. —ii. >c. —C.
11 i2 i2 11 11 13 13 11
pr(U. > c. & U.> c. )7
i12 121 i13 i3l—15—
where the number subscript notation in the last line of equation (5) signifies
subtraction.
To make the model operational we now choose a probability distribution for
the c..'s. We assume that they are independent across individuals, but thatthe
joint density function f(c12,c12,13) is distributed as trivariate normal
N(O,). Thus we allow for covariance among thecd's through specification of Z.
This covariance probit assumption is more general than the conditionallogit
model which assumes independence of the c's. Given the specification of the





Let us represent the unknown parameters of U(s) and E as the vector 0. Thenwe
estimate the unknown paramters by the method of maximum likelihood using thelog
likelihood function
(7) (e) = logL = y..log cii..)
i=l j=1 3
wherey
=1if person i makes choice j and is zero otherwise.
We now consider the specification of the tT(X.., S.) term in equation (4) and
the covariance matrix Z. We use the variables mentioned above as well as
individual attributes to specify .. = Z..8 as a linear in parameters function
13 13—16—
for ease of computation. Note that nonlinear functions of the X. .'sand S. 's can
13 1
enter the Zj's via ratio or polynomial terms. However, the linear—in—parameters
specification does impose a limitation on the model. Since pensions and Social
Security benefits represent a stream of payments over time, they need to be
discounted back to the present. Of course, the discount rate used by the
individual is an unknown parameter of the model. The proper method to introduce
discounting over time is through use of exponential functions, exp (—It), where y
is the unknown discount rate and t is the relevant time period. But since use of
the exponential function would introduce an extremely complicated nonlinearity
into the model, we instead use a quadratic specification in t and t2 as an
approximation that is much simpler to estimate. As it turns out, all of the
quadratic functions take the correct shape as a function of their estimated
parameters. Specification of E also presents a problem.The original Hausman—
Wise (1978) specification would introduce 12 additional covariance parameters
which would be difficult to estimate precisely. Instead we use a considerably
more simple specification which is meant to capture the distribution of
preferences in the population toward work. We allow the parameter representing
age effects to vary in the population, givingthe specification8
(8) 2 2 2 2
tyi-nAge
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Thus, the correlation coefficient p, which measures tastes for Federal
employment or private employment, rises with age. At the sametime the variation—17--
of these two states also rises with age relative to the variance of the
retirement choice. This specification is meant to capture the increasing
variability of the work decision which arises because of the (unobserved)
deterioration of health with increasing age. At the same time, the rising
correlation can capture the effect that taste for work and leisure increasingly
dominates the individual's decision once he has qualified for the appropriate
pensions and their rate of increase becomes less. As it turns out, we estimate
to be an important component of our specification for males. However, for
females, the covariance component does not turn Out to be an important part of
the model.
One last econometric point deserves mention. Since our data set Consists of
a single year's decision by Federal employees aged 55—61, we have omitted
individuals who have previously left the Federal service. Since the probability
of retirement increases with age, we have oversampled younger individuals. But
the age variable and various discounted pension terms should capture this effect.
The problem which might arise is if the model were used for long—run simulation
purposes. If the age distribution of Federal employees is not in equilibrium and
our model does not accurately capture all age effects, the parameter values might
be different for a later period. In particular, we might expect our estimate of
to change. To fully explore this possibility, we would need a complete sample
of Federal employees and their age of termination or retirement. Such data are
not presently available.—18—
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Empirical results for our retirement model are presented in Table 1 below.
The attributes characterizing the three states and the affected individuals are
defined in the accompanying attachment to the table. The inclusion of these
variables in our model was justified in Section 2, where we described the
incentives that induce older workers to leave Federal employment. Note that the
financial variables are included in ratio form, i.e., as replacement rates. This
specification turned out to be more successful in explaining retirement patterns
than the alternative of including values of potential pensions in non—ratio form.
Estimates for both men and women are qualitatively similar so we shall
focus our discussion on the results for men. As expected, the rate of growth of
an individual's wages in the Federal Government (WAGE76/WAGE73) is an excellent
predictor of whether he will remain in Federal service. Two reasons for this
association may be advanced. First, when the direct payoff from worki,ng in the
Federal service is rising rapidly, the attractiveness of Federal employment in
comparison to both private employment and retirement is strengthened. Second,
rapid rises in current wages lead to similarly rapid rises in deferred
compensation because an individual's wage upon leaving Federal service
constitutes one third of the wage base used to compute ultimate pension benefits.
Themorerapid the wage rise, the larger the gain in ultimate pension benefits
from remaining in Federal service. (See equaton (3) above.)
The second set of variables——FED.REPL.RATE, FRR*YR, and FRR*(YR)2——reflects
the generosity of a worker's Federal pension entitlement. As expected, workers
eligible to receive a pension immediately upon leaving Federal service are more
likely to take private employment or to retire than are otherwise identical
workers who can receive a pension only after some delay. Also, among workers whoTABLE 1
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* Thevariable represents an attribute of the indicated state(s):
State #1 =Federalemployment;#2 =privateemployment;
#3 =Retirement.
**Asymptoticstandard errors are listed in parantheses beneath
parameters.
***Theindicated coefficient is constrained to be zero• Empirical



















xVariable Name Variable Description
WAGE76/WAGE73: Ratio of individual's Federal wage in 1976
to wage in 1973.
FED.REPL.RATE: Ratio of individual's nominal pension
entitlement in 1977 to his 1977 wage.*
FRR*YR: FED.REPL.RATE multiplied by the number
of years until individual is eligible to begin
receiving pension.
FRR*(YR)2: FED.REPL.RATE multiplied by the number
until individual is eligible to begin
receiving pension.
CHG.S.S.PEPL.RATE: Change in individual's Social Security
"replacement rate" if he works in "private
employment" in 1977 at his 1977 wage.*
SSRR*YR__RET: S.S.PEPL.RATE multiplied by the number
of years until individual is eligible to
receive Social Security (age 62)——effect on
retirement only.
SSRR*(YR) 2--PET: SSRR*YRmultipliedbythe numberof years
untilindividual is eligible to receive
Social Security (age 62) -—effect on
retirement only.
S.S.REPL.RATEFED: Ratio of individual's nominal Social Security
pension entitlement in 1977 (computed using
1977 formula) to his 1977 wage*__effect on
Federal employment.
SSRR*YR__FED: S.S.REPL.RATE multiplied by the number
of years until individual is eligible to
receive Social Security (age 62)——effect on
Federal employment.
SSRR*(YR)2——FED: SSRR*YR multiplied by the number of years
until individual is eligible to receive
Social Security (age 62) -—effect on Federal
employment.
AGE: Individual's recorded age minus 54 years.
Each of the variables just defined is related to the discussion in Section
2 above.
*
The1977 wage is assumed to be 8 percent higher than the Federal wage
recorded for 1976.—19—
can immediately receive a pension, those who are entitled to a higher replacement
rate are more likely to take private employment or to retire. However, the
evidence concerning Federal pension incentives contains one surprise. Suppose we
consider Federal workers whomust wait one to three years after leaving Federal
service before their pensions commence. Among these workers, the likelihood of
leaving Federal service actually declines as the nominal replacement rate rises.
We conjecture that this may be attributable to inflation. Workers with a higher
replacement rate stand to lose more in absolute terms as a result of price
inflation, and consequently they may be more likely to remain in Federal service
simply to protect the real value of their pension.
The next variable, CHG.S.S.REPL.RATE, is intended to measure the amount of
net gain in ultimate Social Security pension that a worker could obtain by moving
from Federal to private employment. In computing this variable, it is assumed
that his attainable wage in the private sector is equal to his potential 1977
Federal wage. While partly unrealistic, this assumption serves to grossly
distinguish between workers for whom Social Security offers a good payoff and
those who gain only slightly from the "tilt" in OASI benefits. (The variable
takes nonzero values only for workers who are already vested in Social Security
or who would become vested if they worked four additional quarters in the Social—
Security—covered sector.) The estimated coefficient is opposite in sign to what
might be expected ,thoughobviously it is not very precisely measured. However,
the reader should be cautious in interpreting this result, since the incentive to
take Social—Security—covered employment is probably poorly measured by our
variable. (Alternative variable definitions did not yield any better results,
however.)—20—
The next variables (SSRR*YR——RET, and SSRR*(YR)2——RET) capture the effects
of Social Security "wealth" on retirement. As anticipated, the longer the wait
till Social Security benefits commence, the smaller the likelihood of retirement.
However, individuals who will ultimately be entitled to receive Social Security
benefits are actually less likely to retire during their late 50's and early 60's
than are otherwise comparable Federal workers who have no anticipated benefits
under Social Security. We surmise that potential Social Security recipients, to
avoid the high implicit tax in the Social Security earnings test, may concentrate
their earnings in the period before they begin receiving OASI benefits. The next
three variables (S.S.REPL.RATE——FED, SSRR*YR__FED, and SSRR*(YR)2__FED) capture
the effect of Social Security "wealth" on remaining in Federal employment. Here
the response of men and women, although apparently quite similar, is actually
somewhat different. We shall discuss the female results first. On balance,
women who are entitled to eventually receive Social Security benefits are more
likely to leave Federal service than are otherwise comparable women not entitled
to Social Security. (To see this, the reader should note that because of the age
limitation we impose, no woman in our sample is entitled to receive Social
Security benefits for at least one year. For most women in the sample, a longer
period is required. Consequently, the interaction between the Social Security
replacement rate and years—to—benefit receipt causes the overall impact of Social
Security to be negative.) Also, as the Social Security replacement rate rises,
the likelihood of leaving Federal service also rises. Curiously, women who are
closest to being eligible for Social Security (i.e., those who are closest to age
62) are the least affected by its incentive effects.—21—
For men, on the other hand, Social Security "wealth" seems to provide an
inducement to remain in Federal service. On balance, older men who are vested in
Social Security have a greater likelihood of remaining in Federal employment than
comparable men who are not vested. This tendency is greatest for men who are
closest to age 62, the age at which Social Security benefits can commence. For
men in their mid—50's, there is little difference between those vested and those
not vested in Social Security.
The last variable we consider is AGE. As anticipated, advancing age
significantly reduces the likelihood that a Federal worker will choose to work,
either in the Federal Government or in the Social—Security—covered sector. Among
men, although not among women, there is good evidence that the variability of age
effects on working also rises with age. We attribute this to the fact that the
variability of health status rises with advancing age.—22—
5. SIMULATION OF REFORM IMPACTS
It is natural to consider the implications of our results for reform of the
retirement programs now available to Federal employees. In this section we
consider two possible reforms, one involving the Civil Service Retirement System
and the other involving Social Security retirement benefits. Both reforms cause
a change in the financial attractiveness of occupying one or more of the states
we have been considering in this paper. In particular, one or more attributes
obtainable from a particular state can be affected by the reforms, and as a
consequence utility maximizers may attain greater satisfaction by choosing a
different status than the one chosen in the prereform world. We will measure the
impact of the proposed reforms by computing the fraction of people represented by
our sample who would choose a different status in the postreform world than in
the prereform world.
In principle, this can be accomplished in two ways for a given sample.
First, the probability of occupying each of the states in the postreform world
can be computed for each observation. Then each observation can be assigned to a
particular state by means of a random process in which the probability of being
assigned to any state is equal to the computed probability of occupying that
state. The effect of the reform can then be computed by summing up the number of
individuals occupying each of the states and comparing the resulting totals to
the simulated or actual prereform distribution. A second method of computing the
postreform distribution of individuals is to compute the probability of occupying
one of the states si'ccessively for each observation and then to sum the
probabilities across observations. This procedure is then repeated for all but
one of the states. As sample size becomes indefinitely large, both procedures
will yield identical estimates of reform impacts. In this paper we use the—23--
latter method because it is associated with smaller predictionvaribility in
finite samples.
Federal pension reform. The first reform we consider is changing theage
requirements for Federal pension receipt. As noted in the first section, Federal
employees who have met minimum tenure requirements are currently eligible to
receive a pension when they reach age 55. Under the simulatedreform, the
earliest allowed pension receipt is postponed toage 62. Given the distribution
of age in our sample (55 to 61, inclusive),very few persons would become
eligible for pension receipt during the 1977 calendar year under the proposed
reform. (By contrast, nearly half of the men in our sample were eligible for
1977 pensions under the prereform rules.) Thus the reform reduces thepresent
discounted value of the Federal pension. The fact that the Federalwage base is
not indexed in computing a pension entitlement means that the reform also reduces
the real value of the pension once it commences atage 62 for persons retiring
before 62. Our discussion in the first section suggests that this reform should
reduce the incentive to leave Federal employment. Our specification of the
incentives to retire captures this effect in the two interaction terms between
the Federal pension replacement rate and the number ofyears of wait until the
pension commences. The effect of this pension reform on financial variables in
our sample can be seen in Table 2 where we have given the mean sample values both
for the prereform system (column 1) and the postreforni system (column 2). Ascan
be seen in this table, the third and fourth variables listed ——thepension—delay
interaction terms ——aresubstantially increased by the reform.
To estimate the effects of these financial changes on retirementpatterns,
we performed two simulations of the type described above. The first simulation
yields predictions on the prereform retirement pattern; the second, predictionsTABLE 2
MEAN VARIPLEVALUESUNPER PROPOSED REEORMS
Sample mean values
Variable PREREFORM REFORM *1 REFORM#2
SGE 76/WAGE 73 1.3260 1.3260 1.3260
FED. REEL.RATE 0.4516 0.4516 0.4516
FPR*YR 0.6243 2.1866 0.6243
FPR*(YR)2 2.4412 12.3213 2.4412
-
CHG.S.S. PEPL.RATE—PRIV. 0.0085 0.0085 0.0115
CHG. S.S. REPL. PATE_FED.** 0.0 0.0 —0.0039
S.S.REPL. RATE—RET. 0.0514 0.0514 0.0400
SSRR*YR_BET 0.2451 0.2451 0.1909
SSRR*(YR)2__RtT 1.3677 1.3677 1.0654
S.S. PEPL.RATE—FED 0.0514 0.0514 0.0400
SSRR *YR_FED 0.2451 0.2451 0.1909
SSRR*(YR)2__FD 1.3677 1.3677 1.0654
AGE 3.1355 3.1355 3.1355
*variablemeans are computed for the 3,116 malesin the sample used toth
to estimate the parameter values reported inTable 1 aridtosimulate the effects
of the reforms described in the text. Reform #1is the reform in the Civil
Service Retirement System, and Reform #2 is the reformof the Social Security
retirement bcrief it formula.
**thangeinindividual's Social Security "replacement rate" if heworks in "Federal
employment" in 1977 at his estimated 1977Federal wage.-24—
on the postreform pattern. These simulation results are presented in the first
and second panels of Table 3.(The actual prereform retirement pattern is given
in the bottom row of the first panel. As may be seen, the actual prereform
distribution differs only slightly from the predictedpattern, where the
predictions are based on the estimated parameters in Table 1.) The simulation
results suggest, as expected, that the number of older Federal employeesleaving
Federal employment will drop sharply (by 47 percent) as a result of the reform.
The number of workers going into private employment drops even moresharply than
the number choosing complete retirement because Federal work and private workare
"closer" substitutes than Federal work and complete retirement.Interestingly,
there is a larger proportional effect on decisions to leave Federal employment
among older workers (aged 58 to 61) than among the youngest cohort (aged 55).
The readers should note that these simulation results reflect the first—year
effect of the proposed reform. In later years the proportional effect will be
quite different as the composition of the older Federal work force is affected by
cumulative effects of the reform.
Social Security reform. In the introduction to this paper we mentioned that
potential double coverage of civil servants by both Federal pension and Social
Security retirement benefits has raised serious equity questions about the
interaction between th two programs. The equity issue arises because the Social
Security benefit formula is intentionally redistributive, paying larger benefits
relative to contributions to workers with low lifetime earnings than to workers
with high earnings.9 Civil servants do not pay Social Security taxes on their
government earnings, nor do those earnings count in the determination of Social
Security benefits. Consequently, when civil servants become vested in Social
Security they are inappropriately treated as low—wage workers, since only aTABLE 3
SIMULATED PRE REFORM AMD POSTREFORM
RETIREL1ENT PATTERNS AMONG MALES,BYAGE
Ag Group FederalWorkers Private Workers Retirees Total
PrereformDistribution ofWorkers—
55 480 20 41 541
56—57 925 56 97 1,078
58—59 696 51 102 849
60—61 498 34 116 648
Simulated Totals2,599 161 356 3,116
(Actual Totals 2,605 137 374 3,116]
.
Reform #1Distribution ofWorkers—
55 497 12 32 541
56—57 1,006 24 48 1,078
58—59 778 23 48 849
60—61 560 15 73 648
Simulated Totals2,841 74 201 3,116
% Change from
prereform Totals
+9.3% —54.0% —43.5% —
Reform #2Distribution ofWorkers—
55 480 22 39 541
56—57 924 57 97 1,078
58—59 691 49 109 849
60—61 487 35 126 648
Simulated Totals2,582 163 371 3,116
% Change from
Prereform Totals
—0.7% +1.2% —0.8% ——25—
fraction of their lifetime earnings ——thoseearned in Social—Security—covered
employment ——arecounted in Social Security benefit determination.
A variety of reforms has been suggested to reduce or eliminate the
unintended subsidies" that accrue to retired civil servants as a result of
double coverage by Social Security and Federal pensions. The reform we simulate
here was suggested by a panel commissioned by the U.S. Congress to investigate
the interaction between government pensions and Social Security.'0 The panel
suggested computing Social Security benefit entitlements on the basis of the sum
of Federal and Social—Security—covered wages, rather than Social—Security—covered
wages alone. (Federal wages would not, however, become taxable by Social
Security.) This computed replacement rate would than be applied only against
average Social—Security—covered wages (E,) in determining the Social Security
benefit.
To phase in this reform, Federal wages would only be counted starting with
wages paid in an initial year, say 1975. Federal wages paid prior to that year
would not be counted in the benefit determination. In our simulation, we assumed
that 1975 and 1976 (and subsequent years') Federal wages up to the Social
Security taxable maximum were recorded by the Social Security Administration and
were used in computing Social Security benefits under the reformed formula. As
may be seen in Table 2 above, this reform affects a considerable number of
variables in our specification of the retirement decision. All variables
associated with the Social Security replacement rate are of course affected,
though their mean values are only slightly affected because only a small
proportion of persons in our sample is vested in Social Security. In addition,
the reform affects the change in Social Security replacement rate that results
from an additional year of working. Under the prereform system, earnings in the
Federal Civil Service do—26—
notaffect the Social Security replacement rate at all, sinceFederal wages are
not counted in determining Social Security benefits.But under the reformed
system, Social Security benefitsfor Federal employees vested in Social Security
actually fall with each additional year of Federal employment.This change
should affect the relative attractiveness of remainingin Federal employment for
persons vested——or expecting tobecome vested——in Social Security.
The simulation results for this reform are presentedin the bottom panel of
Table 3. The simulation indicates that the reformwould have only a very small
impact on retirement patterns among men aged55 to 61, though of course the
impact may be expected to grow over time asadditional years of Federal wages are
included in the Social Security benefit computation. Inlater years the
reform's effect on Social Security replacement rates will become larger,and the
incentive to retire from market work altogether shouldbecome proportionately
smaller. The reader should recall that our estimateof the effect of the change
in Social Security replacement rates (i.e., thecoefficient on CHC.SS.REPL.RATE)
is not only imprecise but may also be somewhat implausible.Consequently the
impact of one of the most important changes arisingfrom the proposed reform may
not be well predicted. Nonetheless, thesimulation suggests that one of the more
significant of recently proposed reforms maybe expected to have only modest
-effects on Federal retirement patterns in the firstfew years after it is
implemented. 11—27—
SUHMARY
Inthis paper we have presented and estimated a model that predicts the
choice of older Federal workers among three alternatives: continued Federal
employment, employment solely in the Social—Security—covered sector and complete
retirement. Our empirical estimates confirm some reasonable expectations
concerning the effects of certain financial and nonfinancial incentives to
ret ire——
• Both the amount of a Federal pension entitlement and the expected
wait until the pension commences affect the timing of retirement
from the Federal service.
• The rate of anticipated wage growth significantly affects individual
decisions to remain in Federal employment.
• Advancing age is a significant disincentive to remaining in Federal
or non—Federal work.
• Workers who are eligible to ultimately recieve Social Security in
some cases show a different pattern of retirement than do workers
not vested in Social Security:
Vested workers are more likely to remain in Federal service,
especially as they approach age 62.
Among vested workers, those with higher anticipated replacement
rates from Social Security are more likely to remain in Federal
service than those with lower repiacernent rates.
However, our analysis did not reveal any massive shift of Federal workers into
Social—Security—covered employment in order to benefit from the "tilt" in the
Social Security formula. The reader should be very cautious in interpreting this
last result, however, because our measure of the gains from working in Social—
Security—covered employment is extremely imprecise.—28—
Finally, we presented simulation results for males in our sample based upon
making changes in the financial attractiveness of the Federal pension system and
the Social Security, benefit formula. Our results suggest that advancing the age
at which Federal pension receipt is permitted will have a substantial impact on
the pattern of Federal retirement: far fewer Federal employees will choose to
leave Federal for private employment or to leave paid employment altogether. On
the other hand, reform of the Social Security benefit formula to reduce
unintended subsidies to Federal reitrees was found to have only a very small
impact of Federal retirement patterns.
All of our conclusions are presented with the caveat that they are based on
retirement decisions in a self—selected group of nonretirees from Federal
employment. An important goal for future research must be the development of
longitudinal individual records that permit the examination of retirement
decisions within the context of longer term or life—cycle models. In the absence
of such data, inferences about the impact of employer—provided pension programs
must rely on theory and cross—sectional models of qualitative choice.NOTES
1For the first 5 years of Federal service, eachyear adds 0.015 to the
replacement rate; years 6 through 10 add 0.0175 per year to the replacementrate;
and each year in excess of 10 adds 0.02 to the replacement rate.
2Many employees, of course, were not immediately entitled to receivea
pension upon retirement. Thus, only 48 percent of the men and 24 percent of
the women were eligible to receive a pension if they left Federal employment
during 1977.
3For workers with fewer than 10 years' previous service, the increase is
smaller. See note 1.
kFive years of Federal service is required for vesting.
5Among older Federal workers, a substantial fraction are not entitled to
annual merit pay increases.
6The type of random utility specification of equation (1) within thecontext
of a discrete choice model was introduced into the econometrics literature
by McFadden (1974)
7We rule out the possibility of ties in utility rankings.
8The last state is occupied by that fraction of thesample not accounted for
in the preceding states.
9Contributions to the Social Security system come from a fixedpercentage
tax on wage earnings up to a taxable limit per worker per year. The tax is paid
equally by both employers and employees.
0Report of the Universal Social Security Coverage Study Group, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., March 1980. See especiallypp. 82—
83.
11We emphasize that these results are only valid for Federalemployees
between the ages of 55 and 61, inclusive. Since none of these people are
currently eligible for Social Security benefits, which cannot commence until age
62, it is conceivable that the impact of the reform might be much larger on
Federal worker aged 62 and older.REFERENCES
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